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ON “WATERBOARDING”: LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION AND THE CONTINUING 
STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
Daniel Kanstroom*
Abstract: While some aspects of the “waterboarding” debate are largely 
political, the practice also implicates deeply normative underpinnings of 
human rights and law. Attorney General Michael Mukasey has steadfastly 
declined to declare waterboarding illegal or to launch an investigation 
into past waterboarding. His equivocations have generated anguished 
controversy because they raise a fundamental question: should we bal-
ance “heinousness and cruelty” against information that we “might get”? 
Mr. Mukasey’s approach appears to be careful lawyering. However, it por-
tends a radical and dangerous departure from a fundamental premise of 
human rights law: the inherent dignity of each person. Although there is 
some lack of clarity about the precise definition of torture, all is not 
vagueness, or reliance on “circumstances,” and post hoc judgments. We 
have clear enough standards to conclude that waterboarding is and was 
illegal. Official legal equivocation about waterboarding preserves the po-
tential imprimatur of legality for torture. It substitutes a dangerously fluid 
utilitarian balancing test for the hard-won respect for human dignity at 
the base of our centuries-old revulsion about torture. That is precisely 
what the rule of law (and the best lawyers) ought not to do. 
This is the destiny of a democracy—it does not see all means as ac-
ceptable, and the ways of its enemies are not always open before it. A 
democracy must sometimes fight with one hand tied behind its back. 
Even so, a democracy has the upper hand. The rule of law and the 
liberty of an individual constitute important components in its un-
                                                                                                                      
[Editor’s Note: This article appeared originally in volume 29, issue 2, of the Boston College 
Third World Law Journal. Its publication coincided with Mr. Mukasey’s commencement ad-
dress. Because of the article’s obvious affinity with this symposium, the Third World Law Jour-
nal kindly permitted us to reprint it in this issue. We gratefully acknowledge that permission 
and offer our thanks to Eleanor Downes, the article’s original editor.] 
* Director, Boston College Law School Human Rights Program; Associate Director, 
Boston College Center for Human Rights and International Justice, and Clinical Professor 
of Law. This essay is the first part of a larger attempt to analyze the deep legal and ethical 
issues raised by the waterboarding debate. I am deeply grateful to Ellen Downes for en-
couraging me to undertake this project, and to Kent Greenfield, David Hollenbach SJ, and 
Zyg Plater for helpful critique. 
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derstanding of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its 
spirit . . . .1
Introduction: What is “Waterboarding”? 
 The selection of Attorney General Michael Mukasey as this year’s 
commencement speaker has prompted serious, thoughtful, respectful, 
and wide-spread discussions at Boston College Law School and beyond. 
As the Director of Boston College Law School’s Human Rights Pro-
gram, I was pleased to be asked to write a short analysis of what I believe 
to be at stake in this debate. Although it is clearly not intended to be a 
complete treatment of all the complex legal issues, I hope this brief re-
view will be of some use and may help focus future conversations. 
 The questions are basic: Is “waterboarding” torture? Is it “cruel” 
and “inhuman treatment”?2 Does it “shock the conscience”?3 If the 
answer to any of these is yes then what ought we to do about it? While 
some of the debate surely derives from political disagreements, the 
waterboarding questions also involve core ideas and methodologies of 
human rights and law. 
 Let us be clear about what we are discussing. Although the word, 
“waterboarding,” is of recent vintage, the practice is one of the oldest 
and most widely recognized forms of torture.4 This is its essence: a 
person is forcibly seized and restrained. He or she is then immobi-
lized, face up, with the head tilted downward. Water is then poured 
into the breathing passages.5 The exact methods recently used by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are still unknown, but likely have 
involved placing a cloth or plastic wrap over or in a person’s mouth, 
                                                                                                                      
1 HCJ 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. State of Israel [1999], 7 B.H.R.C. 31, 
available at elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/94/000/051/a09/94051000.a09.pdf.
2 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights. G.A. Res. 217A, art. 5, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 2948), available at http://www.un.org/Over- 
view/rights.html; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
3 See Hearing on Oversight of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Fed. 
News Serv. (Lexis), Jan. 30, 2008 (statement of Michael B. Mukasey, Att’y Gen. of the 
United States) [hereinafter Jan. 30, 2008 Hearing]. 
4 See William Safire, On Language; Waterboarding, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 2008, (Magazine), 
at 16 (“If the word torture, rooted in the Latin for ‘twist,’ means anything (and it means 
‘the deliberate infliction of excruciating physical or mental pain to punish or coerce’), 
then waterboarding is a means of torture. The predecessor terms for its various forms are 
water torture, water cure and water treatment.”). 
5 See Evan Wallach, Waterboarding Used to Be a Crime, Wash. Post, Nov. 4, 2007, at B1. 
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then pouring the water.6 As you first think of it, the practice might 
seem rather mild compared to other forms of torture. But the effects 
are dramatic and severe. The inhalation of water causes a gag reflex, 
from which the victim experiences what amounts to drowning and 
feels that death is imminent.7
 Waterboarding is a viscerally effective, coercive interrogation 
technique designed to overcome the will of the individual. It causes 
severe physical suffering in the form of reflexive choking, gagging, 
and the feeling of suffocation. Indeed, if uninterrupted, waterboard-
ing can cause death by suffocation. The victim immediately realizes 
this on the most basic level. By producing an experience of drowning, 
and eliciting a visceral panic response, it causes severe mental pain 
and suffering, distress, and the terror of imminent death. A medical 
expert on torture has testified that waterboarding “clearly can result 
in immediate and long-term health consequences. As the prisoner 
gags and chokes, the terror of imminent death is pervasive, with all of 
the physiologic and psychological responses expected . . . . Long term 
effects include panic attacks, depression and PTSD.”8
 Waterboarding has long been understood as torture, from its 
earliest incarnations during the Spanish Inquisition through its system-
atic use by the Khmer Rouge.9 It has been called torture by modern 
authorities ranging from the tribunals that tried Japanese war criminals 
in the aftermath of the Second World War to Senator John McCain, who 
has stated that waterboarding a detainee is torture— “no different than 
holding a pistol to his head and firing a blank.”10 Similarly, former 
Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge has said, “There’s just no 
doubt in my mind—under any set of rules—waterboarding is torture.”11
                                                                                                                      
 
6 See id. 
7 See id. 
8 U.S. Interrogation Policy and Executive Order 13440: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on 
Intelligence, Sept. 25, 2007 (statement of Allen S. Keller, Director, Bellevue/NYU Program 
for Survivors of Torture), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/070925/akeller.pdf. 
9 See George Ryley Scott, The History of Torture Throughout the Ages 171–
72 (2003) (describing the “torture of water” (“[s]ometimes referred to as tormento de toca”) 
which was used “when the racking, in itself, proved ineffectual. The victim . . . was com-
pelled to swallow water, which was dropped slowly on a piece of silk of fine linen placed in 
his mouth. . . . A variation of the water torture was to cover the face with a piece of thin 
linen, upon which the water was poured slowly, running into the mouth and nostrils and 
hindering or preventing breathing almost to the point of suffocation.”); Dana Milbank, 
Logic Tortured, Wash. Post, Nov. 2, 2007, at A2. 
10 See Waterboarding: Interrogation or Torture?, CBS News, Nov. 1, 2007, available at http:// 
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/01/national/main3441363.shtml; Wallach, supra note 5. 
11 Former Bush Official: Waterboarding is Torture, MSNBC, Jan. 18, 2008, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22735168/. “One of America’s greatest strengths is the 
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 The vast majority of experts in the field concur in this view—and 
by this I do not only mean human rights scholars and activists, among 
whom I am sure there is unanimity.12 Waterboarding is explicitly barred 
by the new Army Field Manual.13 Indeed, in a November 2007 letter to 
the Senate, four retired U.S. Judge Advocates General stated: 
“Waterboarding is inhumane, it is torture, and it is illegal. . . . [I]t is 
not, and never has been, a complex issue, and even to suggest 
otherwise does a terrible disservice to this nation. . . . This must end.”14
 However, CIA director, General Michael Hayden, has admitted 
that the CIA used waterboarding on three prisoners during 2002 and 
2003.15 As is now well-known, the CIA had been advised by the Justice 
Department Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) that the practice was not 
illegal.16 We now know that certain OLC lawyers, responding to im-
mense political pressure and engaging in shockingly poor legal tech-
nique, gave incorrect legal advice to interrogators.17 Depending on 
                                                                                                                      
 
soft power of our value system and how we treat prisoners of war, and we don’t torture. . . . 
And I believe, unlike others in the administration, that waterboarding was, is—and will 
always be—torture. That’s a simple statement.” Id. 
12 See, e.g., Human Rights First & Physicians for Human Rights, Leave No Marks: 
Enhanced Interrogation Techniques and the Risk of Criminality 17–18 (2007) 
(examining ten interrogation techniques, including waterboarding, and noting that doc-
tors have documented that survivors of water torture suffer from long lasting-trauma and, 
even more than a decade after the event, physical pain), available at http://physiciansfor 
humanrights.org/library/documents/reports/2007-phr-hrf-summary.pdf. 
13 U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Field Manual 2-22.3: Human Intelligence Collector Opera-
tions 5-21 (2006), available at http://www.army.mil/institution/armypublicaffairs/pdf/ 
fm2-22-3.pdf; U.S. Dep’t of Army, Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency D-5 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf [hereinafter FM 3-24]. The new 
counterinsurgency manual, much of which was written by Lt. Gen. David Petraeus and 
retired Col. Conrad Crane, was released in December 2006. See FM 3-24. 
14 Letter from Donald J. Guter et al., Retired Judge Advocate General, to Sen. Patrick 
Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov. 2, 2007), available at http://leahy.senate. 
gov/press/200711/110207RetGeneralsOnMukasey.pdf. In 2006, the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee held hearings on the authority to prosecute terrorists. Id. The sitting Judge Advo-
cates General of the military services were asked to respond to a series of questions regard-
ing “the use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of drowning 
(i.e., waterboarding).” Id. They unanimously and unambiguously agreed that such conduct is 
inhumane and illegal and would constitute a violation of international law, particularly 
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Id. 
15 See Hearing on Worldwide Threats Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, Fed. News 
Serv. (Lexis), Feb. 5, 2008 (statement of Michael Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence 
Agency). 
16 See infra text accompanying notes 80–83. The job of the OLC is to interpret federal 
law within the executive branch. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/olc/index.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2008). 
17 See generally Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside 
the Bush Administration (2007). As Jack Goldsmith reports being told by David 
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how one interprets the Nuremberg precedents, this could amount to 
what Jack Goldsmith has called “get-out-of-jail-free cards” for the inter-
rogators.18 Perhaps that is fair. But the lawyers themselves may not es-
cape unscathed.19
I. Is Waterboarding Legal? 
 Mr. Mukasey has maintained a strikingly equivocal approach to wa-
terboarding. He has admitted that he would view waterboarding as tor-
ture, were it done to him.20 He properly has criticized the disgraceful 
“Bybee Memo” of August 2002—which, among other flagrant errors, re-
defined the legal standard for torture as: “equivalent to the pain that 
would be associated with serious physical . . . injury so severe [as to 
cause] death, [or] organ failure. . . .”21 He called it “worse than a sin.”22 
Perhaps more to the point, he said it was “a mistake” and “unneces-
sary.”23
                                                                                                                      
Addington, “The President has already decided that terrorists do not receive Geneva Con-
vention protections. . . . You cannot question his decision.” Id. at 41. 
18 Id. at 97; see Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 5 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12), at 11–14, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. 
Int’l L. Comm’n 375, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/34 (Principle IV provides that “the fact that a 
person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him 
from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to 
him.”); United States of America v. Alstötter et al. (The Justice Case) 6 L.R.T.W.C. 1 (1948) 
(trial of sixteen defendants, from the Reich Ministry of Justice or People’s and Special 
Courts, raising the issue of what responsibility judges have for the enforcement of alleged 
war crimes and crimes against humanity that were authorized by arguably binding laws); In 
re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 16–17 (1946) (recognizing the doctrine of command responsibil-
ity, under which commanding officers are liable if they exercised effective control over 
subordinates who engaged in torture in violation of the law of nations or knew or had 
reason to know of their subordinates’ unlawful conduct but failed to take reasonable 
measures). 
19 See Press Release, Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, Durbin and Whitehouse: Justice De-
partment is Investigating Torture Authorization: Senate Judiciary Democrats Called for 
Inquiry into DOJ’s Role in Overseeing CIA’s Use of Waterboarding (Feb. 22, 2008). In 
February 2008, the Justice Department revealed that its internal ethics office was investi-
gating the department’s legal approval for waterboarding by the CIA. See id. 
20 Jan. 30, 2008 Hearing, supra note 3. “Would waterboarding be torture if it was done 
to you?” Senator Kennedy asked. “I would feel that it was,” Mr. Mukasey answered. Id. 
21 Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel on Standards of Conduct for Interro-
gation under §§ 2340–2340A to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), 
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/gonzales/memos_dir/memo_2002 
0801_JD_%20Gonz_.pdf [hereinafter Bybee Memo]. 
22 Nomination of Michael Mukasey to be the Attorney General of the United States: Hearing of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Fed. News Serv. (Lexis), Oct. 17, 2007 [hereinafter Oct. 17 
Nomination Hearing]. 
23 Oct. 17 Nomination Hearing, supra note 22. 
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 But he still has declined steadfastly to declare waterboarding illegal. 
He sometimes has adopted a sophisticated judicial posture, befitting his 
past role as a well-respected judge: “one should refrain from addressing 
difficult legal questions in the absence of concrete facts and circum-
stances.”24 He finds the legality of waterboarding to be a “difficult” legal 
question “about which reasonable minds can and do differ.”25 He says 
that “it is not an easy question” and that assessing the legality of the 
practice depends upon an evaluation of “circumstances.”26
 As to the consequences of past waterboarding, Mr. Mukasey has 
said that because Justice Department lawyers concluded that the CIA’s 
use of waterboarding was legal, the department cannot investigate 
whether a crime had occurred.27 “That,” he stated, “would mean that 
the same department that authorized the program would now consider 
prosecuting somebody who followed that advice.”28 Before the Senate, 
Mr. Mukasey put it this way: “I start investigations out of some indica-
tion that somebody might have had an improper authorization. I have 
no such indication now.”29 But one might well ask, if the 2002 memo 
was “worse than a sin” and “a mistake” how can it not have been an 
“improper authorization?”30
 The answer, as we shall see, is that Mr. Mukasey apparently does 
not believe that waterboarding necessarily was or would be illegal. He 
likely believes that clarity is a simplistic virtue—indeed only one among 
many professional virtues required of an Attorney General—and that 
                                                                                                                      
24 Letter from Michael B. Mukasey, Att’y Gen. of the United States, to Patrick Leahy, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary ( Jan. 29, 2008) at 2, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
ag/speeches/2008/letter-leahy-013008.pdf; see also Nomination of Michael Mukasey to be the 
Attorney General of the United States: Hearing of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Fed. News Serv. 
(Lexis), Oct. 18, 2007 (“I don’t know what’s involved in the technique. If waterboarding is 
torture, torture is not constitutional.”). 
25 Letter from Michael B. Mukasey to Patrick Leahy, supra note 24, at 2. 
26 Id. At times, though, his tone has been more that of the executive branch and nota-
bly consequentialist: “any answer that I could give could have the effect of articulating 
publicly and to our adversaries the limits and the contours of generally worded laws that 
define the limits of a highly classified interrogation program.” Id. 
27 See Justice Department Oversight: Hearing of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Fed. News 
Serv. (Lexis), Feb. 7, 2008 [hereinafter Feb. 7 Oversight Hearing]. 
28 Id. He also opined, “For me to use the occasion of the disclosure that that technique 
was once part of the CIA program, an authorized part of the CIA program, would be for 
me to tell anybody who relied, justifiably, on a Justice Department opinion that not only 
may they no longer rely on that Justice Department opinion, but that they will now be 
subject to criminal investigation for having done so. That would put in question not only 
that opinion, but also any other opinion from the Justice Department. . . . And that’s not 
something that I think would be appropriate, and it’s not something I will do.” Id. 
29 Jan. 30, 2008 Hearing, supra note 3. 
30 Id.; Oct. 17 Nomination Hearing, supra note 22. 
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he has powerful ethical and institutional constraints in this matter, in-
cluding OLC morale, and protection against civil lawsuits and criminal 
prosecutions.31 There is surely truth to this, but I do not think it is the 
deepest truth. 
 To my mind, perhaps the most interesting testimony given by Mr. 
Mukasey was the following rather simple exchange: 
SEN. BIDEN: When you boil it all down . . . it appears as 
though whether or not waterboarding is torture is a relative 
question, where it’s not a relative question whether or not you 
hung someone by their thumbs from, you know, or you stuck 
someone, you know, hung them upside down by their feet. . . . 
ATTY GEN. MUKASEY: With respect, I don’t think that that’s 
what I’m saying. I don’t think I’m saying it is simply a relative 
issue. There is a statute under which it is a relative issue. . . . 
[E]ssentially a balancing test of the value of doing something 
as, against the cost of doing it. 
SEN. BIDEN: When you say against the cost of doing it, do 
you mean the cost in—that might occur in human life if you 
fail to do it? Do you mean the cost— 
ATTY GEN. MUKASEY: No. 
SEN. BIDEN: —in terms of our sensibilities, in what we think 
is appropriate and inappropriate behavior as a civilized soci-
ety? What do you mean? 
ATTY GEN. MUKASEY: I chose—I chose the wrong word. I 
meant the heinousness of doing it, the cruelty of doing it bal-
anced against the value. 
SEN. BIDEN: Balanced against what value? 
ATTY GEN. MUKASEY: The value of what information you 
might get.32
 Why have Mr. Mukasey’s equivocations generated such anguished 
controversy, even though the practice is, according to him, not “author-
ized for use” in the current CIA interrogation program?33 The answer, I 
believe, is revealed by the above dialogue. Waterboarding implicates 
the very deepest values of our legal system. This includes a basic meth-
                                                                                                                      
31 See Pedro Ruz Gutierrez, Mukasey Shoring Up Morale at Main Justice, Legal Times, 
Apr. 21, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1208774503039. 
32 Jan. 30, 2008 Hearing, supra note 3. 
33 Letter from Michael B. Mukasey to Patrick Leahy, supra note 24, at 2 (explaining 
that the CIA Director, Attorney General, and President would all have to approve use of a 
currently unauthorized technique). 
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odological question: do we balance “heinousness and cruelty” against 
information that we “might get”?34 Or should we demand forceful and 
clear statements of principle about certain practices? Do we rely on the 
hidden judgments of OLC lawyers, on post hoc assessments by reviewing 
courts after a future detainee is waterboarded, or can we put the issue 
to rest once and for all? 
 Certain legal words, such as genocide, slavery, and torture, carry 
unusually deep resonance and weight. They are the embodiments, the 
crystallizations and, one would hope, the points of repose of once con-
tentious but now settled political, legal, and moral disputes. Thus, 
much is at stake when Mr. Mukasey states that he believes there are cir-
cumstances in which waterboarding would not be torture and could be 
legal: “There are some circumstances where current law would appear 
clearly to prohibit the use of waterboarding. Other circumstances 
would present a far closer question.”35
 I respectfully, but fundamentally, disagree. On first blush, Mr. Mu-
kasey’s approach might appear to be the prudent reasoning of a careful 
lawyer, steeped as we all are, in the broad realist tradition. However, to 
many observers, and especially to a human rights lawyer such as myself 
who has counseled and represented many torture victims, it appears to 
be something quite different.36 It portends a radical and dangerous 
departure from the fundamental premises of human rights law: the in-
herent dignity of each person and the basic ideal of inalienable 
rights.37 It therefore implies a deep disagreement over what Felix 
Cohen once called “the social ideals by which the law is to be judged.”38
                                                                                                                      
 
34 Jan. 30, 2008 Hearing, supra note 3. 
35 Letter from Michael B. Mukasey to Patrick Leahy, supra note 24, at 2. 
36 Mr. Mukasey also said that he has concluded that other current methods used by the 
CIA to interrogate terror suspects “comply with the law.” Id. at 2. Elisa Massimino, Washing-
ton Director of Human Rights First, responded, “If Attorney General Michael Mukasey thinks 
there are circumstances under which waterboarding is legal, that’s all the more reason Con-
gress should not defer to his judgment on the legality of any other interrogation technique 
used in the CIA’s enhanced interrogation program.” Press Release, Leading Rights Group 
Rejects AG’s Testimony On Waterboarding, Legality of CIA Program ( Jan. 30, 2008), available 
at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/usls/2008/alert/411/. 
37 See generally Oscar Schachter, Editorial Comment, Human Dignity as a Normative Con-
cept, 77 Am. J. Int’l L. 848, 848 (1983). For an interesting discussion of the grounding of 
the human dignity principle, see generally Eric Blumenson, Who Counts Morally?, 14 J.L. & 
Religion 1–40 (1999–2000). The Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations states 
that “we the peoples of the United Nations” are “determined . . . to reaffirm faith in fun-
damental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights 
of men and women and of nations large and small.” U.N. Charter pmbl. Article 1 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “All human beings are born free and equal 
2009] On “Waterboarding” 211 
II. The Iconic Abhorrence of Torture 
 To see why this is so, we must understand that torture is a special 
case, iconically abhorred by our law.39 The nascent idea of the modern 
legal system, the rule of reason in law—and indeed the very idea of 
rights—were all linked to the abolition of torture.40 Rejection of torture 
has been accurately described as “a distinguishing feature of the com-
mon law,” admired by authorities ranging from William Blackstone to 
Voltaire.41 Lord Hoffmann has recently noted that “the rejection of tor-
ture by the common law has a special iconic significance as the touch-
stone of a humane and civilised legal system.”42
 The objections to torture were always of two types. First, in the An-
glo-American tradition, torture came to be seen as “‘totally repugnant 
to the fundamental principles of English law’” and “‘repugnant to rea-
son, justice, and humanity.’”43 Many also abhor it on moral grounds. As 
Bishop Thomas G. Wenski has written, “the question of how we treat 
detainees” is a “profound moral question” that “has a major impact on 
human dignity. [P]risoner mistreatment compromises human dignity. 
                                                                                                                      
in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act to-
wards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” G.A. Res. 217A, supra note 3, art. 1. 
38 Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 
809, 812 (1935) (“When the vivid fictions and metaphors of traditional jurisprudence are 
thought of as reasons for decisions, rather than poetical or mnemonic devices for formu-
lating decisions reached on other grounds, then the author, as well as the reader, of the 
opinion or argument, is apt to forget the social forces which mold the law and the social 
ideals by which the law is to be judged.”). Moreover, it raises ethical concerns as “lawyer-
ing.” See Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Editorial Comment, Speaking Law to Power: 
Lawyers and Torture, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 689, 691–95 (2004) (considering the ethical re-
quirements of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct as “professional qualities that 
protect against legal advice or advocacy that might undermine the national interest in 
respect for law, or subvert or erode the international legal order”). 
39 See generally Harold Hongju Koh, A World Without Torture 43 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 
641, 642 (2005) (“The right to be free from torture is an indelible part of the American 
experience.”). 
40 See generally Karen J. Greenberg, Introduction: The Rule of Law Finds Its Golem: Judicial Tor-
ture Then and Now to The Torture Debate in America 1 (2006) (Karen J. Greenberg, ed.). 
41 A. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] UKHL 71 [11]; William Black-
stone, 4 Commentaries *318, *320–32; Voltaire (attributed), Commentary on Cesare Bec-
caria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments xxxix–xliii (London, 1770). 
42 [2005] UKHL 71, at [83]. 
43 See id. at [12] (quoting David Jardine, A Reading on the Use of Torture in the 
Criminal Law of England Previously to the Commonwealth 6, 12 (London, Baldwin 
& Cradock 1837); see also Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the 
White House, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1681, 1719 (2005). 
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A respect for the dignity of every person, ally or enemy, must serve as 
the foundation of security, justice and peace.”44
 Torture was also frequently viewed as forensically unreliable, 
though this argument was generally linked to the fundamental con-
demnation.45 We should also, perhaps recall, in light of recent debates 
about the power of the U.S. president, that the abolition of torture in 
English history was part of the struggle to determine the limits of Royal 
prerogative as against the common law.46 This connects to yet another 
concern about torture: its tendency to spread; what Henry Shue has 
called its “metatastic tendency.”47 As William Holdsworth wrote, “Once 
torture has been acclimatized in a legal system it spreads like an infec-
tious disease. It saves the labour of investigation. It hardens and brutal-
izes those who have become accustomed to use it.”48
 In this broad tradition, I hold to a view about torture that is rather 
simple, straightforward and, I believe, apolitical and non-ideological. 
To paraphrase Justice Robert Jackson, if there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional and human rights constellation, it is that torture is 
illegal.49 There are simply no exceptions to this rule under the corpus 
of human rights law. There can be no balancing, no utilitarian calculus, 
no “torture warrants,” and no “ticking bomb” hypotheticals.50 We 
                                                                                                                      
 
44 Letter from Thomas Wienski, Chairman, Comm. on Int’l Pol’y, U.S. Conference of 
Catholic Bishops (Sept. 15, 2006), available at http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/international/ 
2006septemberlettertosenate.pdf. 
45 See, e.g., Beccaria, supra note 41, at 57–69. There is a potential distinction between 
the use of torture evidence in judicial-type proceedings versus its use for security-based or 
investigative purposes. David Hume once described the latter practice as “a barbarous 
engine.” 2 David Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting Crimes 
324 (Edinburgh, Bell & Bradfurte 1844). 
46 5 William Holdsworth, A History of English Law 194–95 (2d ed. 1937). For a 
time, torture—though illegal under the common law—was “justified by virtue of the ex-
traordinary power of the crown which could, in times of emergency, override the common 
law.” Id. at 194. Coke, who initially accepted the existence of this power, later saw it as “in-
compatible with the liberty of the subject” and concluded “that all torture is illegal.” Id. 
47 Henry Shue, Torture, 7 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 124, 143 (1978). 
48 Holdsworth, supra note 46, at 194 (citation omitted). 
49 See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
50 Space limitations preclude complete repetition of the persuasive de-bunking of this 
facile trope here. As Jeremy Waldron has pointed out, among other defects, 
[t]he hypothetical asks us to assume that the power to authorize torture will 
not be abused, that intelligence officials will not lie about what is at stake or 
about the availability of the information, that the readiness to issue torture 
warrants in one case (where they may be justified by the sort of circumstances 
Dershowitz stipulates) will not lead to their extension to other cases (where 
the circumstances are somewhat less compelling), that a professional corps of 
torturers will not emerge who stand around looking for work, that the exis-
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simply do not legally torture people under any circumstances.51 As Jer-
emy Waldron writes, “We can all be persuaded to draw the line some-
where, and I say we should draw it where the law requires it, and where 
the human rights tradition has insisted it should be drawn.”52
 Fortunately, the rejection of torture, grounded in a respect for 
human dignity, has long been a foundational legal principle for the 
United States. Although U.S. statutory and constitutional law may use 
different phrasing than certain international legal instruments, I believe 
that the ultimate rule is and must be the same.53
 To cite just a few brief examples, Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, long accepted by the United States, clearly prohibits “cruel 
treatment and torture” as well as “outrages upon personal dignity.”54 
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the 
United States has ratified, each state simply and absolutely that: “No one 
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”55 And of course there is the United Nations 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which the United States has ratified.56 
                                                                                                                      
tence of a law allowing torture in some cases will not change the office poli-
tics of police and security agencies to undermine and disempower those who 
argue against torture in other cases, and so on. 
Waldron, supra note 43, at 1716; see also David Luban, Essay, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking 
Bomb, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1425, 1440 (2005) (“The idea is to force the liberal prohibitionist to 
admit that yes, even he or even she would agree to torture in at least this one situation. Once 
the prohibitionist admits that . . . all that is left is haggling about the price.”); Ass’n for the 
Prevention of Torture, Defusing the Ticking Bomb Scenario: Why We Must Say No 
to Torture, Always (2007). 
51 Waldron, supra note 43, at 1714–15. 
52 Id. at 1715. 
53 See Wallach, supra note 5. 
54 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
55 G.A. Res. 217A, supra note 3, art. 5; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. No. E, 95–2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The 
ratification was accompanied by the following reservation: “The United States considers 
itself bound by Article 7 to the extent that ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’ means the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the 
Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.” 
S. Exec. Rep. No. 102–23, at 22 (1992). The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
generally accepted in the United States as authoritative, holds that a reservation is neither 
valid nor effective if it purports to defeat the “object and purpose” of the treaty. See Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 19, done on May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
56 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
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The CAT not only prohibits torture but it also requires states to “take 
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent 
acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction,” and to “ensure 
that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law.” 57
 Let us pause on this point for a moment. Not only is torture 
definitively rejected under any circumstances, but states are affirmatively 
obliged to prohibit it, to punish it, and to prevent it.58 As the former 
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture observed more than twenty years 
ago, “If ever a phenomenon was outlawed unreservedly and unequivo-
cally it is torture.”59 To carry out the United States’ obligations under 
the CAT, Congress enacted the Torture Convention Implementation Act 
(the Torture Act) which provides that: 
[w]hoever outside the United States commits or attempts to 
commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any 
person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be 
punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for 
life.60
Thus, if the waterboarding, now admittedly conducted by CIA agents, 
was “torture” and was committed outside the United States there are 
very serious potential criminal consequences.61
 The prohibition against torture is also widely recognized as jus cogens 
(that is, a “peremptory norm”) and a “non-derogable” principle, as 
fundamental a rule as law can sustain.62 It is clearly an obligation of the 
                                                                                                                      
57 Id. arts. 2(1), 4(1). 
58 See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95–17/1, Judgment, ¶ 155 (Dec. 10, 1998). 
59 Special Rapporteur on Torture, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15 (Feb. 19, 1986) (prepared by 
Peter Kooijmans). 
60 Torture Convention Implementation Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 506(a), 108 
Stat. 463 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A); see H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-482, at 
229 (1994). The statute took effect on Nov. 20, 1994, the date that the United States be-
came a party to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. 
61 Conduct constituting “torture” occurring within the United States is also clearly 
prohibited by various federal and state criminal statutes. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 113, 114, 2261A 
(2000) (describing assault, maiming, and interstate stalking). 
62 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 55, art. 53; see also Re-
statement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102 & n.6 
(1987); Erika de Wet, The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of jus cogens and Its 
Implications for National and Customary Law, 15 Eur. J. Int’l L. 97, 98 (2004). This means it 
is a principle of international law so fundamental that no nation may ignore it or attempt 
to contract out of it in any way. A treaty that violates jus cogens is void. Id. 
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type recognized by the Nuremberg Tribunals as the “very essence,” 
pursuant to which “individuals have international duties which transcend 
the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual State.”63
 Human rights law recognizes that certain rights may be suspended 
by governments during a “time of public emergency which threatens 
the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially pro-
claimed.”64 But the prohibition against torture—like those against slav-
ery and genocide—is exempted from this provision.65 Such actions may 
never be done to anyone under any circumstances. Article 2 of the CAT pro-
vides: “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war 
or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public 
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”66
 Article 15 of the CAT makes clear that statements made as a result 
of torture are inadmissible in any proceedings.67 Put simply, these 
principles are the clear embodiment of what many deem the most 
important achievement of human rights law: the crystallization of legal 
norms to protect the basic dignity of the individual. At base, we do not 
torture because: 
torture’s object is precisely not just to damage but to destroy a 
human being’s power to decide for himself what his loyalty 
and convictions permit him to do . . . to reduce its victim to a 
screaming animal for whom decision is no longer possible— 
the most profound insult to his humanity, the most profound 
outrage of his human rights.68
As one court has noted, “the torturer has become like the pirate and 
slave trader before him, hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”69
 If an Attorney General endorses or fails to clearly condemn the 
use of torture, we are on the dangerous road described so well by Jus-
tice Jackson in his Korematsu dissent.70 The rationalization of such con-
                                                                                                                      
63 See Judgment, Monday, Sept. 30, 1946 in 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Be-
fore the International War Tribunal 223 (1947). 
64 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 4. 
65 See id. arts. 4, 6–8 (barring derogation from prohibitions on genocide, torture, and 
slavery). 
66 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, supra note 56, art. 2. 
67 See id. art. 15 (except “against a person accused of torture as evidence that the 
statement was made”). 
68 Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Politi-
cal Debate 38–39 (2006). 
69 Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). 
70 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) ( Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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duct “to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rational-
izes the Constitution to show that [it] sanctions such an order, [vali-
dates the principle which then] lies about like a loaded weapon ready 
for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim 
of an urgent need.”71
 For all these reasons, Mr. Mukasey has vigorously and properly 
condemned torture in the abstract. This is where the complexity arises. 
The clarity with which torture is rejected is not matched by similar clar-
ity in its definition. Indeed, there is a well-recognized definitional prob-
lem regarding torture, the full complexities of which are beyond the 
scope of this short essay.72 Still, all is not vagueness and reliance on 
“circumstances” and on post hoc judgments. If that were the case, then 
the abhorrence of torture would be meaningless. We have clear 
enough definitions for many purposes, including to conclude that 
waterboarding, even if perhaps not the worst of tortures, is and was 
clearly illegal. 
III. The Interpretation Dilemma: Underlying Values and the 
“Shocking” of Conscience 
I think it would be very difficult to be a Kantian and to have any responsi-
bility in the government.73
 
 Torture is formally defined by the CAT as “any act by which severe 
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted 
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person, 
information or a confession . . . .”74
 The Torture Act defines the term “severe mental pain or suffering” 
in relevant part as “the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting 
from—(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe 
physical pain or suffering; . . . [or] (C) the threat of imminent death 
. . . .”75
                                                                                                                      
71 Id. 
72 See generally Gail H. Miller, Defining Torture (2005). 
73 Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/04/ 
waldronyoo-debate-on-torture.html (Apr. 26, 2005) (quoting John Yoo during 2005 debate 
with Jeremy Waldron at Columbia University). 
74 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, supra note 56, art. 1. The Convention entered into force with respect to the 
United States on Nov. 20, 1994. S. Treaty Doc. 100–20 (1994). 
75 Torture Convention Implementation Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 506(a), 108 
Stat. 463 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A). 
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 How should these standards be interpreted? The disgraceful and 
now repudiated outer limit of the interpretive exercise regarding 
torture was the so-called “Bybee Memo” of August 1, 2002.76 Written by 
John Yoo, the memo argued that torture required that “[t]he victim 
experience intense pain or suffering of the kind that is equivalent to 
the pain that would be associated with serious physical injury so severe 
that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in loss of 
significant body function will likely result.”77 This interpretation was 
expressly reversed by a memo written by Daniel Levin on December 30, 
2004, which concluded that “severe” pain under the statute is not lim-
ited to such “excruciating or agonizing” pain.78 But the OLC still de-
clined to conclude that waterboarding was torture. 79
 It is beyond the scope of this essay to consider why OLC lawyers 
may have acted as they did. However, as one reviews the description of 
waterboarding with which this essay begins, recall that the ultimate 
question is not only whether waterboarding is torture. It is whether it 
is clearly illegal. As to this, I do not think there can be any doubt. 
 Consider the War Crimes Act (WCA), which criminalizes “war 
crimes” whether they occur inside or outside the United States.80 From 
1997 until 2006, the WCA defined “war crimes” to include grave 
breaches of any of the Geneva Conventions or conduct that constituted 
a violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.81 The Su-
preme Court’s Hamdan decision made clear that Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions does apply to suspected al-Qaeda detainees, 
requiring that they be “treated humanely,” and prohibiting “outrages 
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treat-
ment.”82 The 2006 Military Commissions Act (MCA) retroactively 
                                                                                                                      
76 See Bybee Memo, supra note 21; Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant 
Att’y General, on Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A for James B. 
Comey, Deputy Att’y General (Dec. 30, 2004), available at news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/ 
terrorism/dojtorture123004mem.pdf [hereinafter Levin Memo]. 
77 Bybee Memo, supra note 21, at 13; see Goldsmith, supra note 17, at 142. 
78 Levin Memo, supra note 76, at 2. 
79 See id. at 2 n.8. Levin further determined that the statute also prohibits certain con-
duct specifically intended to cause “severe physical suffering” as distinct from “severe 
physical pain.” Id. at 10–12. In a footnote, however, Levin maintained, that “we have re-
viewed this Office’s prior opinions addressing issues involving treatment of detainees and 
do not believe that any of their conclusions would be different under the standards set 
forth in this memorandum.” Id. at 2 n.8. 
80 See War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-192, 110 Stat. 2104 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000)). 
81 Id.; see Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 
54, art. 3. 
82 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2973 (2006). 
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narrowed the WCA to a “grave breach” of Common Article 3.83 The 
category, however, still includes both torture and “cruel or inhuman 
treatment.” 84 Indeed, under the MCA, mental harm need not be 
“prolonged” as required by the Torture Act, but may be “serious and 
non-transitory.”85
 “Cruel, inhuman or degrading” conduct that does not quite rise to 
the level of “torture” is also prohibited by the CAT.86 The Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) specifically prohibited “cruel, unusual 
and inhuman treatment or punishment” against any individual in U.S. 
custody regardless of location or nationality.87 The DTA, however, states 
that “the term ‘cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment’ means the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punish-
ment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution of the United States . . . .”88
 It was in regard to this statute that Mr. Mukasey testified: “There 
is a statute under which it is a relative issue . . . which is a shocks-the-
conscience standard, which is essentially a balancing test of the value 
of doing something as, against the cost of doing it.”89
 One may well differ about how far this balancing test can legiti-
mately go. But note, first, that the shocks-the-conscience analysis only 
becomes necessary if one concludes that waterboarding is not necessarily 
                                                                                                                      
83 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(b)(1)(A), (2), 120 Stat. 
2600, 2633–35 (2006) (to be codified in scattered sections of at 10, 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.) 
(making changes retroactive to November 26, 1997). 
84 §6 (b)(1)(B)(d)(1)(A)–(B), 120 Stat. at 2633. The definition is essentially the same 
as that of the Torture Act, except that the WCA requires that the act be “for the purpose of 
obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, or any reason 
based on discrimination of any kind.” See §6 (b)(1)(B)(d)(1)(A), 120 Stat. at 2633. 
85 § 6(b)(2)(E), 120 Stat. at 2634–35. The MCA also authorized the potential admis-
sion of coerced testimony (but not torture evidence) in military trials. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 
at 2607. Put simply, it is now possible that Guantánamo defendants could receive the death 
penalty based on evidence obtained from witnesses who were subjected to waterboarding, 
if it is not considered to be torture. Therefore, in that regard at least, the question of 
whether waterboarding is torture could have profound significance. See §3 (a)(1), 120 Stat. 
at 2607. 
86 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, supra note 56, pmbl. 
87 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1403, 119 Stat. 3136, 3475 
(2006) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000dd). 
88 Id. The United States added the following to its instrument of ratification of the CAT: 
“The United States understands the term, ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment,’ as used in Article 16 of the Convention, to mean the cruel, unusual, and inhumane 
treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution of the United States.” S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, at 15–16. 
89 Jan. 30, 2008 Hearing, supra note 3. 
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torture. Further, we might recall that the very DTA language relied upon 
by Mr. Mukasey to invoke the shocks-the-conscience test was part of an 
amendment offered by Senator John McCain, who has specifically called 
waterboarding a form of torture and clearly illegal.90 The shocks-the-
conscience test is one formulation of a due process standard. It is some-
times—incorrectly, in my view—cited by supporters of harsh interroga-
tion tactics as authorizing a utilitarian balance between the nature of 
the conduct and the government’s interest in doing such things.91 
Clearly, the test tends towards the subjective and the retrospective. But 
can it be, when applied to waterboarding, “essentially a balancing test 
of the value of doing something as, against the cost of doing it”? I do 
not think so. Indeed, I believe that this balancing approach is as fun-
damental an error as one can make in this setting because it replaces 
what should be primarily a “dignity-based” analysis with an impermissi-
ble and dangerously utilitarian one.92
 The shocks-the-conscience test (in this context) derives from the 
1952 case of Rochin v. California, in which the police had unsuccessfully 
attempted to remove suspected capsules of morphine from a suspect’s 
mouth.93 They later took him to a hospital and ordered doctors to 
pump his stomach. In his majority opinion for the Court, Justice Frank-
                                                                                                                      
90 See infra note 11. Indeed, Senator McCain has taken a clear position on the relation-
ship between the DTA standard and waterboarding: 
[T]he President and his subordinates are . . . bound to comply with Geneva. 
That is clear to me and all who have negotiated this legislation in good 
faith. . . . 
 . . . . 
. . . We expect the CIA to conduct interrogations in a manner that is fully 
consistent not only with the Detainee Treatment Act and the War Crimes Act 
but with all of our obligations under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 
Press Release, Sen. John McCain, McCain Urges Final Passage of the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006 (Sept. 28, 2006) (emphasis added). 
91 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). In a substantive due 
process analysis, a court must first determine if a statute infringes upon a fundamental right 
and then whether such infringement is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state inter-
est.” In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the Court stated that “conduct deliberately intended to 
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likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level.” 523 U.S. 833, 834 (1998) (emphasis added). 
More recently, in Chavez v. Martinez, Justice Thomas, in a plurality opinion, wrote “the need 
to investigate whether there had been police misconduct constituted a justifiable government 
interest . . . .” 538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003). However, as Justice Kennedy wrote, “[a] constitu-
tional right is traduced the moment torture or its close equivalents are brought to bear.” Id. 
at 789–90 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
92 See Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing 
Approaches to Due Process, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 510, 525–26, 531 (1986). 
93 342 U.S. 165, 166, 172 (1952). 
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furter noted that the due process question implicated “‘canons of de-
cency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous 
offenses.’”94 The Court derived from this a resonant holding that ex-
plicitly used the prohibition against torture as its touchstone: “the pro-
ceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend 
some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism . . . . They are 
methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional 
differentiation.”95
 The Rochin Court also specifically recognized the role played by 
human dignity in its analysis: noting that its decision related to “force 
so brutal and so offensive to human dignity in securing evidence from a 
suspect as is revealed by this record.”96 Although there have been inti-
mations by some justices in recent cases that a review of all the circum-
stances is required before a court declares a particular practice to 
shock-the-conscience, this is not necessary or proper as to waterboard-
ing.97 The inquiry always requires a determination of what the United 
States has traditionally considered to be out of bounds. In short, there 
are—indeed, there must be—some acts that are prohibited regardless 
of the surrounding circumstances. Imagine if the question were 
whether cutting off the toes of a detainee shocks-the-conscience. Do we 
balance? Does it depend upon the circumstances? To be sure, none of 
these definitions and standards are completely clear nor generally 
thought to be immutable. The question is: to which principles should 
one turn to as interpretive guides? And, in the waterboarding context, 
do those principles counsel vagueness and reliance on post hoc judg-
ments or prophylactic clarity? Justice Frankfurter’s reasoning appears 
to be vastly superior in this regard to that of John Yoo. Let us look to 
canons of decency and fairness, to abhorrence of torture, and to hu-
man dignity. 
Conclusion 
 Official legal equivocation about waterboarding is not merely a 
technical matter. It is wrong and it is dangerous. It preserves the im-
primatur of legality for torture and it shields the wrongful conduct of 
the past from proper scrutiny and judgment. Perhaps even worse, it 
                                                                                                                      
94 Id. at 169 (citing Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945)). 
95 Id. at 172. 
96 Id. at 174 (emphasis added). 
97 See infra note 92. 
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substitutes a dangerously fluid utilitarian balancing test for the hard-
won respect for human dignity at the base of our centuries-old revul-
sion about torture. That, in my view, is precisely what the rule of law 
(and the best lawyers) ought not to do. 
 Even if one were inclined to quibble about the precise definition 
of torture, surely there can be no doubt—and surely a responsible 
government official ought to be able to say—that waterboarding is 
illegal.98 As the editors of the Los Angeles Times put it: “[Mukasey’s] 
statements . . . set a dangerous and hypocritical standard of conven-
ience for torturers. Such repugnant equivocation will be mimicked 
and distorted in dark corners around the world . . . .”99
 I would never presume to interpret for others the deep values that I 
believe have long sustained Boston College and its law school. I certainly 
do not think that those values mandate or support any kind of ideologi-
cal litmus test. I am completely comfortable with the general proposi-
tion that a range of ideological viewpoints among commencement 
speakers is a healthy and necessary practice. But, in my view, this matter 
of waterboarding is not an essentially political question. Nor is it an es-
pecially close call as a matter of law. It does, however, cut to the heart of 
the most profound legal and ethical questions of our time. 
                                                                                                                      
98 See Ken Gormley, Archibald Cox: Conscience of a Nation 338–58 (1997); Bilder 
& Vagts, supra note 38, at 693. 
99 Editorial, It’s Torture; It’s Illegal, L.A. Times, Feb. 2, 2008, at A20, available at http:// 
www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editorials/la-ed-mukasey2feb02,0,5132906.story. 
